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ABSTRACT
The U.S. both tolerates more inequality than Europe and believes its economic mobility is greater
than  Europe's.  These  attitudes  and  beliefs  help  account  for  differences  in  the  magnitude  of
redistribution through taxation and social welfare spending. In fact, the U.S. and Europe had roughly
equal rates of inter-generational occupational mobility in the late twentieth century. We extend this
comparison  into  the  late  nineteenth  century  using  longitudinal  data  on  23,000  nationally-
representative British and U.S. fathers and sons. The U.S. was substantially more mobile then Britain
through 1900, so in the experience of those who created the U.S. welfare state in the 1930s, the U.S.
had indeed been "exceptional." The margin by which U.S. mobility exceeded British mobility was












[W]e have really everything in common with America nowadays, except, of course,
language. Oscar Wilde, The Canterville Ghost (1887).
The economies of Britain and the U.S. have had much in common over the two centuries
since the American Revolution: their legal traditions and property rights systems, sources of labor,
capital, and technology, political ties and alliances in two world wars, and – Wilde’s quip
notwithstanding – language and culture are the most obvious. One significant respect in which they
have differed, however, is the progressivity of their taxation and the scale of their social welfare
spending, at least through the late 1970s. Policies in the U.S. reflect a belief that high rates of
economic mobility leave little need for substantial redistribution by the state. Public opinion surveys
are consistent with these priorities and a belief in high rates of mobility: Americans are less
concerned by inequality and are less willing to support redistribution than Europeans regardless of
their position in the income distribution. (Alesina, Di Tella, and MacCulloch, 2001)
Since the 1970s, new large, nationally-representative longitudinal datasets for a variety of
industrialized countries have made possible systematic cross-country mobility comparisons that call
into question the assumptions regarding mobility that seem to underlie U.S. redistributive policies.
The U.S. today exhibits no more income mobility or occupational mobility across generations than
similarly developed countries (Solon, 2002; Solon, 1999; Erickson and Goldthorpe, 1992), though
U.S. policies for the last 75 years have been predicated on American “exceptionalism” to the
mobility patterns seen across a broad set of nations. Piketty (1995) provides a model of “dynastic
learning” in which two economies can, as a result of differences in mobility in the past, settle upon2 Piketty contends that “The multiplicity of steady states explains at the same time why different
countries can remain in different redistributive equilibria, although the underlying structural parameters of
mobility are essentially the same. This is particularly likely if a country exhibited for some time in the past a
significantly different experience of social mobility before joining the ‘common’ pattern. The ‘canonical’
application is the United States, whose nineteenth century mobility and class structure differed significantly
from that of Europe before the two countries [sic] converged in the twentieth century.” (p. 554) As we shall
see below, the extent of the difference in mobility between the nineteenth century U.S. and the twentieth
century U.S. is itself a subject of some controversy and one upon which we offer new evidence below.
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and retain very different redistributive regimes even after their mobility patterns have converged.
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The question we address is whether we can identify, for Britain and the U.S., those historical
differences in mobility, particularly intergenerational occupational mobility.
Commentators throughout the nineteenth century suggested that the U.S. was indeed
“exceptional” in the occupational mobility experienced by its population (as well as in its geographic
mobility). Using nationally-representative data for Britain and the U.S. that follows 23,000 pairs of
fathers and sons from the beginning of the 1850s to the beginning of the 1880s, we offer the first
detailed comparisons of the mobility regimes experienced by these two countries in the generation
before they constructed their respective welfare states. In the process, we also offer a new
perspective on the very different histories of labor relations and political activity by workers in
Britain and the U.S. that past scholars (e.g. Turner in the 1890s; Sombart in the early 1900s;
Thernstrom in the 1970s) have attributed to different amounts of economic opportunity and
mobility by individual workers. Can we actually observe sufficiently large differences to explain these
differences in labor radicalism?
Britain was chosen as the country to which to compare the U.S. experience because of the
availability of comparable data (described below). But this is also a particularly illuminating
comparison because of the large number of characteristics these two economies have shared since
the middle of the nineteenth century when U.S. industrialization got underway. Intergenerational3 Björklund and Jäntti (1999, pp. 15-19) summarize some of the relative merits of income and
occupation for the measurement of intergenerational mobility, and discuss scenarios in which they provide
very different results. McMurrer et al. (1997) offer a similar discussion of the relative advantages of different
measures of intergenerational mobility. 
4 No explicit comparison for Britain between mobility in the second half of the nineteenth century
and in the second half of the twentieth century is made because of data comparability issues discussed below.
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occupational change was adopted as the metric for mobility for reasons of convenience as well: it is
the only economic outcome that can be examined throughout the period since 1850. It is in some
ways superior to income as a measure of mobility, and in some ways inferior.
3 But it is what we have,
and has already been the object of a great deal of research in sociology where methods to analyze
mobility have evolved substantially since the 1960s. 
Previous Research on 19
th Century Mobility in Britain and the U.S.
Our primary interest is in (1) assessing the differences in mobility between Britain and the
U.S. in the second half of the nineteenth century; (2) comparing that difference to the difference
observed by the 1970s; and (3) explicitly evaluating the change in mobility within the U.S. from the
second half of the nineteenth century to the second half of the twentieth.
4 There has been until now
a lack of appropriate data to undertake any of these tasks (though there has been considerable work
comparing twentieth century mobility rates across a set of developed countries, including Britain and
the U.S., in the absence of data adequate to task (1), it has not been possible to say how mobility
differences among countries have changed over long periods of time). We briefly survey the existing
literatures in these areas before proceeding to our own contribution.
The comparison between Britain and the U.S. in the nineteenth century has been marked by
the boldest pronouncements and the weakest empirical evidence. Britain has been viewed, since the
time of de Tocqueville and Marx, as a considerably more rigid system in which family background
plays a much more significant role is determining current prospects than in the U.S. These5 In the 1830s, de Tocqueville noted, “Among aristocratic peoples, families remain for centuries in
the same condition and often in the same place. . . . Among democratic peoples [e.g. in the U.S.], new families
continually spring from nowhere while others disappear to nowhere and all the rest change their complexion.”
Three decades later in the 1860s, Marx saw the U.S. as more open and fluid than the older European societies,
with their “developed formation of classes.” American classes, on the other hand, “have not yet become fixed
but continually change and interchange their elements in constant flux.” He related “this situation to the
immature character of the American working-class movement.” He characterized the U.S. as having “a
continuous conversion of wage laborers into independent self-sustaining peasants. The position of wages
laborer is for a very large part of the American people but a probational state, which they are sure to leave
within a longer or a shorter term.”  A few years after the U.S. Census Bureau declared that the country’s
internal frontier no longer existed, Frederick Jackson Turner (1921, Chapter IX) described social mobility,
particularly that in the western state, as crucial in the development of American democracy: “This, at least, is
clear: American democracy is fundamentally the outcome of the experiences of the American people in
dealing with the West. Western democracy through the whole of its earlier period tended to the production of
a society of which the most distinctive fact was the freedom of the individual to rise under conditions of
social mobility, and whose ambition was the liberty and well-being of the masses.” In the first decades of the
early twentieth century, Werner Sombart (1906) attributed the absence of socialism in the U.S. to higher rates
of occupational mobility than in Europe. In the 1970s, Thernstrom shared Marx’s and Sombart’s belief that
nineteenth century American workers enjoyed greater opportunity for social mobility than did their European
counterparts, and that this heightened class fluidity had much to do with America’s particular environment of
class relations and labor organization:
American workers…failed to flock into labor and socialist parties to the same extent as their
European counterparts in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries because of the greater
permeability of the class structure that governed their lives…The American class
system…allowed substantial privilege for the privileged and extensive opportunity for the
underprivileged to coexist simultaneously. It is tempting to argue that…[this] explains…the
relative absence of acute class conflict in our political history.
Thernstrom goes on to point out that “as yet, there have not been enough quantitative studies of
mobility in the European past to make systematic comparison possible.” (Thernstrom, 1973).
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differences have been attributed to a number of factors – the frontier and the rapid growth of
completely new cities in the U.S., the feudal tradition and guild and apprenticeship systems in
Britain, and the wide availability of free, public education in the U.S.
5 But there has been no
consistent data with which these assertions could be directly tested. There are several studies that
have looked at both British nineteenth century mobility and U.S. nineteenth century mobility in
isolation.
For nineteenth century Britain, Miles (1993 and 1999) and Mitch (1993) have each used
samples of marriage registrations from 1839 to 1914 to measure intergenerational occupational6 Their samples were somewhat different. They both used marriage registries, but they used different
(possibly overlapping) samples of registries.
7 The marriage registry data include only couples married in Anglican churches, so toward the end of
the nineteenth century, these samples are increasingly unrepresentative. By 1914, 42 percent of all marriages
took place outside the Anglican church (Vincent, 1989, p. 281).  Also, the occupations of the groom and his
father are recorded at the time of the groom’s marriage, so the father’s and son’s occupations are observed at
different points in their life cycles, with the son being considerably younger than the father. If it were possible
to observe the father’s and son’s occupations holding age constant, a different picture of intergenerational
mobility might emerge. Specifically, we might expect to observe a greater likelihood of mobility as the son
gained years and experience in the labor market.
8 The principal difficulty with historical estimates for the U.S. is that they were most often
constructed by observing a single community over a period of decades. The only individuals whose
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mobility.
6 At the time of registration, both bride and groom as well as bride’s father and groom’s
father were required to list their occupation. From this information, Miles calculates that between 60
and 68  percent of grooms married between 1839 and 1894 were in the same occupational class as
their fathers when the grooms married. (Miles, 1999, p. 29). Though his finding are in general quite
similar, Mitch finds evidence for slightly more mobility – 61 percent of grooms married between
1869 and 1873 were in the same class as their father, 20 percent were higher, and 19 percent lower.
The data used in both studies, however, are less than ideal.
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For the nineteenth century U.S., a large number of studies have been completed for specific
communities in the U.S. that give us a rough sense of occupational mobility in the past. For
example, among males who remained in Boston, from 37 to 40 percent of sons ended up in the
same occupational categories as their fathers over the period 1840-89. (Thernstrom, 1973, p. 83)
Though this might in itself seem a sufficient basis on which to conclude that the nineteenth century
U.S. had greater intergenerational occupational mobility than nineteenth century Britain (total
mobility – the fraction of sons found outside their fathers’ occupational categories – was twice as
great in Boston as in Britain), the data for Boston suffers, like that from Britain, from a number of
shortcomings that prevent such simple comparisons.
8occupational mobility could be observed were those who remained in the community. It would be surprising
if the movers and stayers did not have systematically different patterns of occupational mobility, given the
positive and often substantial costs of migration. Occupational mobility measured using marriage records
suffers from the same shortcoming as the British data: sons’ occupations are examined at different points in
their careers than fathers’ occupations. The new nineteenth century data used below for the U.S. (like that for
Britain) is not limited to individuals who remained in a place for a decade or more and examines sons’ and
fathers’ occupations at similar ages, presenting a more representative picture of mobility than has previously
been available. Though Thernstrom asserted his findings for Boston were consistent with an “American
Pattern,” others were less sanguine regarding mobility in the nineteenth century. Summarizing the literature
on intergenerational mobility in the past, McMurrer et al. (1997) conclude, “Overall, the existing evidence
suggests that mobility was likely not as great as suggested by popular literature and the writings of Tocqueville
on the openness of American society. Most of the rich during earlier periods w ere apparently born rich.”
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Two additional difficulties apart from the inconsistencies in the collection of the data and
biases introduced by the source materials are: (1) the possibility that differences between the British
and U.S. occupational structures account for much of the difference in total mobility; and (2) the
possibility that even in the absence of these differences in occupational distributions, the imprecision
of the mobility measure employed would obscure more fundamental differences or similarities in
mobility. The measures of mobility provided in our analysis overcome these difficulties.
One study offers a long-run perspective on intergenerational occupational mobility within
Britain: Miles (1999) attempts to reconcile his findings of increasing fluidity over the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries with work by Erickson and Goldthorpe (1992), among others, who discern
no trend in intergenerational mobility from the 1940s to the 1970s. Differences in the data for the
two eras (Miles used marriage registers and Erickson and Goldthorpe relied on survey data with a
retrospective question on the occupation of the respondent’s father when the respondent was 14
years of age) diminish the reliability of this comparison.
Only two studies have attempted to assess how intergenerational mobility changed between
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the U.S. In a re-analysis of several city-specific studies
from the nineteenth century and together with the Occupational Change in a Generation (OCG)
cohorts for the twentieth, Grusky (1987) concluded that there was significant immobility in the9 Grusky concludes, “This case for ‘American Exceptionalism’ can be evaluated only by comparing
the data for Europe and America in the nineteenth century. It should be clear, however, that the present study
casts doubt on this interpretation [that current belief in high rates of mobility in the U.S. results from rates
that were indeed higher than those elsewhere in the past, though the U.S. rate some time ago converged to the
more general pattern], since the rates of mobility in the United States have increased over the last century.”
(Grusky, 1987, p. 120) Though Grusky’s data make it possible for him to compare mobility over more than a
century, there are significant parts of the population excluded from the nineteenth century samples he
employs because they are based on the population that remained resident for a decade or more in a set of four
cities and towns (Poughkeepsie, NY; Holland, MI; Atlanta, GA; and Boston, MA). These samples necessarily
exclude (1) anyone who migrated into or out of any of these cities during the time period examined; (2)
farmers and farm laborers living outside these cities and towns (at time when half of the civilian labor force
was employed in agriculture and most of them lived outside cities and towns); and (3) any rural residents (at a
time when more than three quarters of the U.S. population still lived in places of fewer than 2,500
inhabitants).
10 In their nineteenth century data, the individual’s father’s occupation was observed in 1880, and the
individual’s own occupation was observed in 1900, twenty years later. In the two OCG cohorts, the
individual’s own occupation was observed in the survey year (1962 or 1973), but the father’s occupation
reported was that for the father when the respondent was 16 years of age. Guest et al. (1989) used males from
the OCG  who were 25-34 in the survey year, so they have between 9 (for 25 year olds) and 18 years (for 34
year olds) between the report of their father’s occupation and the report of their own.  
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nineteenth century, with the non-manual/manual divide particularly difficult to cross, and an
increase in intergenerational mobility from the nineteenth century to the twentieth century.
9 
The work by Guest et al. (1989) is closest to the comparison between U.S. mobility in the
nineteenth century and twentieth centuries carried out below. Comparing a sample of young males
linked from the 1880 U.S. census to the 1900 U.S. census, they find little change from the last two
decades of the nineteenth century to the end of the period covered by the second OCG cohort
(1973). Their comparison is less than entirely apt, however. Their nineteenth century data excluded
most interstate migrants, and the time between the observation of the fathers’ and sons’ occupations
was in all cases greater (by as much as a factor of two) in the nineteenth century data than in the
twentieth century data.
1011 Treiman and Ganzenboom (2000) provide a useful survey of the entire history of comparative
research on occupational mobility, both within and across generations.
12 Contrasting views are found in Wong (1990) who finds greater mobility in Britain than in the U.S.,
and Yamaguchi (1987) who finds mobility greater in the U.S. than in Britain.
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The literature comparing twentieth century intergenerational mobility across developed
countries is now voluminous.
11 The comparison between Britain and the U.S. undertaken by
Kerckhoff et al. (1985), like almost all international comparisons involving these two countries, uses
the Oxford Social Mobility Study (1972) for Britain and the second cohort of the OCG (1973) for
the U.S. They find “considerably more overall inter-generational and career mobility in the United
States, but . . . the major differences between the two societies are due to shifts in the distributions
of kinds of occupations.” (1985, p. 281). Erickson and Goldthorpe (1992) examine a broader set of
countries, and likewise find the U.S. and Britain roughly similar in intergenerational mobility, after
accounting for differences in the distributions of occupations across the two countries, as did
Grusky and Hauser (1984) in analyzing a set of 16 countries including Britain and the U.S.
12 In
income terms, Solon (2002) and Björklund and Jäntti (1999) find similarly high rates of income
immobility across generations in Britain and the U.S., with both exhibiting considerably less mobility
from fathers to sons than Canada, Finland, and Sweden.
The Data
We use a common methodology in constructing nineteenth century data to compare
mobility between the U.S. and Britain. For both countries we link a sample of males from the
1850/1851 census to the census taken thirty years later in 1880/1881. Our choice of Britain as a
comparison was dictated by the availability of sources making it possible to construct longitudinal
data in exactly the same manner as for the U.S. For Britain we use information on approximately
13,000 males linked from the 1851 British census to the 1881 British census, and for the U.S. on13 “White Collar” is comprised of professional, technical, and kindred; managers, officials, and
proprietors; clerical; and sales. “Farmer” is comprised of  only farm owners and farm managers.
“Skilled/Semiskilled” is comprised of craftsmen and operatives. “Unskilled” is comprised of  service workers
and laborers, including farm laborers.
14 The Oxford Mobility Study for Britain is available at the U.K. Data Archive at the University of
Essex as study number 1097. See http://www.dataarchive.ac.uk/. The Occupational Change in a Generation
study is available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research as study number
6162. See http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/.
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nearly 10,000 males linked from the 1850 to the 1880 U.S. Federal Censuses. Details on the
matching procedure, representativeness,  and sensitivity tests are described in the Appendix.
The only economic outcome available in the longitudinal data used here is self-reported
occupation. We observe the father’s occupation in 1850 (U.S.) or 1851 (Britain) and the son’s
occupation thirty years later. After collapsing hundreds of occupational titles into a reasonable set of
categories it becomes possible to construct tables that describe the transitions from fathers’
occupational categories to sons’ occupational categories. We have used four categories (white collar,
farmer, skilled and semi-skilled, and unskilled) to reduce the sparseness of the mobility tables, but
where it has been possible to use a larger number of categories, the basic qualitative results reported
below are unchanged.
13
For the twentieth century, we have employed the same data as others who have worked in
this area: the Oxford Mobility Study for Britain and the OCG (1973 cohort) for the U.S.
14 In each
the respondent’s occupation at the time of the survey is taken as the son’s occupation, and the
occupation that the respondent reported his father to have had when the respondent was age 14
(Britain) or 16 (U.S.) is taken as the father’s. To prevent differences in the impact of the Great
Depression from influencing the results, males age 31-37 (whose fathers’ reported occupations
would have been in 1949-1955) were used from the British data and males age 33-39 (whose fathers’
reported occupations would have been in 1950-1956) were used from the U.S. data. This yields a15 We are in the process of creating additional British (1881-1901) and U.S. (1900-1920) data with
twenty year intervals. 
16 No ordering can be imposed on the occupations. When we turn to analysis of the nineteenth
century data with four categories (white collar, farmer, skilled/semi-skilled, and unskilled), it is possible to
rank unskilled last unambiguously, but it is not clear how to rank the others relative to unskilled. There are no
good sources that would allow us to calculate average incomes by occupation. We thus require analysis
techniques that rely not on the ordering of occupational categories but only on their labeling.
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range of years between fathers’ and sons’ occupations of 17 to 23 years, and an average of roughly
20. This was done to ensure comparability with the U.S. data from the nineteenth century: though
the direct nineteenth century comparison between Britain and the U.S. will use a thirty-year interval
between fathers’ and sons’ occupations (a restriction dictated by the sources available for Britain),
the U.S. sources also allowed the creation of two twenty-year samples (one with fathers observed in
1860 and sons observed in 1880, and one with fathers observed in 1880 and sons observed in 1900).
These will be used for assessing change in mobility over time within the U.S.
15
Measuring and Modeling Intergenerational Occupational Mobility
Intergenerational occupational mobility can be assessed through the analysis of simple two
dimensional matrices, with categories for fathers’ occupations arrayed across one dimension and
categories for sons’ occupations arrayed across the other. Comparing mobility across two places or
times requires comparison of two matrices. Suppose fathers and sons can be found in either of two
jobs.
16 A matrix that summarizes intergenerational mobility in location P has the form 
with fathers’ occupations (1 or 2) as columns and sons’ occupations (1 or 2) as rows. The entry in
the upper left (p11) is the number of sons of job 1 fathers who themselves obtained job 1. One
simple measure of the overall mobility in P is the fraction of sons who end up in jobs different from
those of their fathers: MP=(p12+p21)/ (p11+p21+p12+p22).11
Though this measure has the virtue of simplicity as a benchmark, it also has a shortcoming
when mobility is compared across two matrices P and Q: it does not distinguish between differences
in mobility (1) arising from differences across the matrices in the distributions of fathers’ and sons’
occupations (differences in what Hauser, 1980, labels “prevalence”) and (2) arising from differences
across the matrices in the association between father’s and sons’ jobs that may occur even if the
distributions of fathers’ and sons’ occupations were identical in P and Q (differences in what
Hauser, 1980, calls “interaction”). Consider  and   for which MP=10/30 and
MQ=25/65. The marginal frequencies differ, so it is not clear whether the difference in observed
mobility M results from this difference or from something more fundamental such as differences
between P and Q in the amount of human capital necessary to achieve job 1 . 
One way to proceed is to adjust one of the matrices so it has the same marginal frequencies
as the other. Such a transformation, if achieved by multiplication of rows and columns by
appropriate constants, does not alter the underlying mobility embodied in the matrix. (Mosteller,
1968; Altham and Ferrie, 2005) If we were to multiply the first row of Q by ½ and then multiply the
second column of the resulting matrix by ½, we would produce a new matrix QN with the same
marginal frequencies as in matrix P, with an associated total mobility measure MQN. We could then
calculate the difference MP - MQN and be confident that the difference in mobility does not result
from differences in the distributions of occupations between the two locations.
There still may be differences in mobility between P and Q, even after adjusting the marginal
frequencies and finding that MP - MQN = 0, however. The fundamental measure of association
between rows and columns in a mobility table is the cross-product ratio, which for P is p11p22/p12p21
and can be rearranged to give (p11/p12 )/(p21/p22 ), the ratio of (1) the odds that sons of job 1 fathers
get job 1 rather than job 2 to (2) the odds that sons of job 2 fathers get job 1 rather than job 2. If17 See Altham and Ferrie (2005) for a discussion of the distance measure and test statistic, and for
algorithms for their computation.
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there is perfect mobility, the cross-product ratio would be one: sons of job 1 fathers would have no
advantage in getting job1 relative to sons of job 2 fathers. The more the cross-product ratio exceeds
one, the greater the relative advantage of having a job 1 father in getting job 1. The cross-product
ratio for both P and Q is 4, so these matrices have the same underlying mobility.
For a table with more than two rows or columns, there are several cross-products ratios, so a
summary measure of association should take account of the full set of them. One such measure has
been suggested by Altham (1970): the sum of the squares of the differences between the logs of the
cross-product ratios in tables P and Q. For two tables which each have r rows and s columns, it
measures how far the association between rows and columns in table P departs from the association
between rows and columns in table Q:
The metric d(P,Q) tells us the distance between tables P and Q.
17 A simple likelihood-ratio P
2
statistic G
2 (Agresti, 2002, p. 140) with (r-1)(s-1) degrees of freedom can then be used to test
whether the matrix 1  with elements 2ij=log(pij/qij) is independent; if we can reject the null
hypothesis that 1 is independent, we essentially accept the hypothesis that d(P,Q)0 so the degree
of association between rows and columns differs between table P and table Q. The statistic does not
tell us which table has the stronger association, but that can be determined by calculating d(P,I) and
d(Q,I), which use the same formula as d(P,Q) but replace one table with a matrix of ones. If
d(P,Q)>0 and d(P,I)>d(Q,I), we can safely conclude that mobility is greater in table Q (i.e. mobility13
is closer in Q than in P to what we would observe under independence of rows and columns, in
which the occupation of a father provides no information in predicting the occupation of his son).
Contingency tables are often dominated by elements along the main diagonal (which in the
case of mobility captures immobility or occupational inheritance). It will prove useful to calculate an
additional version of d(P,Q) that examines only the off-diagonal cells to see whether, conditional on
occupational mobility occurring between fathers and sons, the resulting patterns of mobility are
similar in P and Q. This new statistic will then test whether P and Q differ in their proximity to
“quasi-independence.” (Agresti, 2002, p. 426) For square contingency tables with r rows and
columns, this additional statistic d
 i(P,Q) will have the same properties as d(P,Q), but the likelihood
ratio P
2 statistic G
2 will have [(r-1)
2-r] degrees of freedom.
Because it is a pure function of the odds ratios in tables P and Q, d(P,Q) is invariant to the
multiplication of rows or columns in either table by arbitrary constants. As a result, d(P,Q) provides
a measure of the difference in row-column association between two tables that abstracts from
differences in marginal frequencies. Because [d(P,Q)]
2 is a simple sum of the squares of log odds
ratio contrasts, it can be conveniently decomposed into its constituent elements: for an r × s table,
there will be [r(r-1)/2][s(s-1)/2] odds ratios in d(P,Q) and it will be possible to calculate how much
each contributes to [d(P,Q)]
2, in the process identifying the locations in P and Q where the
differences between them are greatest.
In analyzing how mobility differs between two tables, we will then proceed in three steps:
1. calculate total mobility for each table as the ratio of the sum of the off-diagonal elements to the
total number of observations in the table, and find the difference in total mobility between P and Q;
2. adjust one of the tables to have the same marginal frequencies as the other and re-calculate the
difference in total mobility to eliminate the influence of differences in the distribution of
occupations; 18 See Hauser (1980).
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3. calculate d(P,Q), d
 i(P,Q), d(P,I), and d(Q,I) and the likelihood ratio P
2 statistics G
2; if d(P,Q)0,
calculate the full set of log odds ratio contrasts and identify those making the greatest contribution
to [d(P,Q)]
2.
This differs substantially from common practice in sociology, where the estimation of log-
linear models has dominated the empirical analysis of mobility since the 1960s.
18 Log-linear analysis
decomposes the influences on the log of each entry in a contingency table into a sum of effects for
its row and column and an interaction between the row and column. Controlling for row and
column effects eliminates the effect of the distribution of fathers’ and sons’ occupations on mobility.
The remaining interaction between rows and columns captures the strength of the association
between rows and columns which in turn measures mobility, though the coefficient on the
interaction term has no meaning in itself as it is a component of a highly non-linear system. In
comparing mobility in two tables, attention is generally focused on the statistical significance of the
difference in the interaction effect rather than on its magnitude. In addition, a simple comparison of
differences in the interaction term is seldom performed without the imposition of additional
structure. For example, it might be supposed that all of the odds ratios in P differ in exactly the same
degree from all of the odds ratios in Q, or that the odds ratios can be partitioned into sets that differ
uniformly across the tables. 
This results in a bewildering number of specifications, and may account for some of the
conflicting findings even in the use of identical data sets when mobility rates are compared for
modern economies (Britain has been shown to have the same mobility as the U.S., less mobility than
the U.S., and more mobility than the U.S.). The measure of underlying mobility adopted here (1)
relies on fewer assumptions, (2) by construction, abstracts from differences in mobility arising from
differences across the tables in the distributions of occupation, (3) generates a simple, meaningful15
measure of the distance between the row and column association in P and the row and column
association in Q, and (4) allows us to isolate the specific odds ratios that account for the largest part
of difference between the association in P and the association in Q.  
Britain vs. the U.S. in the Twentieth Century
Before turning to the nineteenth century, we assess the difference in mobility between
Britain and the U.S. using the tools described in the previous section. We have used males age 31-37
in 1972 from the Oxford Mobility Study and white, native-born males age 33-39 in 1973 from the
Occupational Change in a Generation survey. These ages were chosen to avoid the influence of the
Great Depression. All cases in which the respondent reported a non-civilian occupation for himself
or his father were excluded. Table 1 provides a cross-classification of son’s occupation by father’s
occupation, and Table 2 provides summary measures of mobility for each panel in Table 1 and for
differences in mobility between the panels.
According to the simple measure of total mobility M, young men in their thirties in 1972-73
were less likely  in the U.S. than in Britain to find themselves in the occupations their fathers had in
1949-55. But this difference was largely a result of differences in the occupational structures of the
two economies. If total mobility is measured using either the British or U.S. distributions of
occupations, the gap in total mobility falls from 11.4 percentage points to 3 percentage points. If
Britain had the U.S. occupational distribution but the underlying association between rows and
columns actually seen in Britain, and the U.S. had the British occupational distribution but the
underlying association between rows and columns actually seen in the U.S., the British (53.7 percent)
would have actually had more total mobility than the U.S. (48.3 percent). 16
Father's Occupation
White Skilled/
Son's Occupation       Collar Farmer          Semiskilled Unskilled      Row Sum
Britain (Table P):
  White Collar       174.0       11.0      206.0       38.0      429.0
                      (68.2)     (25.6)     (30.7)     (24.5)
  Farmer         2.0        9.0        3.0        1.0       15.0
                       (0.8)     (20.9)      (0.4)      (0.6)
  Skilled/Semiskilled    71.0       19.0      417.0      102.0      609.0
                      (27.8)     (44.2)     (62.2)     (65.8)
  Unskilled         8.0        4.0       44.0       14.0       70.0
                       (3.1)      (9.3)      (6.6)      (9.0)
  Column Sum 255.0       43.0      670.0      155.0 1123.0
U.S. (Table Q):
  White Collar       595.0      144.0      539.0      164.0     1442.0
                      (71.4)     (31.9)     (43.6)     (35.1)
  Farmer         3.0       61.0        7.0        5.0       76.0
                       (0.4)     (13.5)      (0.6)      (1.1)
  Skilled/Semiskilled 186.0      193.0      576.0      236.0     1191.0
                      (22.3)     (42.8)     (46.6)     (50.5)
  Unskilled        49.0       53.0      115.0       62.0      279.0
                       (5.9)     (11.8)      (9.3)     (13.3)
  Column Sum       833.0      451.0     1237.0      467.0 2988.0
Table 1. Intergenerational Occupational Mobility in Britain and the U.S., 1949-55 to 1972-73, Males
31-37 (Britain) and 33-39 (U.S.) in Terminal Year. Frequencies (Column Percent).
In both Britain and the U.S., an underlying association between fathers’ and sons’
occupations apart from that induced by differences in occupational distributions was present (for
both, we can reject the null hypothesis that their association between rows and columns was the
same as we would observe under independence). The difference between them in their degrees of
association is small in magnitude (7.9), and we cannot reject at any conventional significance level
the null hypothesis that their associations are identical. This is not solely the result of strong
similarities in the tendency of sons to inherit their fathers’ occupations, as we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that association is identical even if we focus only on the off-diagonal elements in each
table. These results confirm the findings of Erickson and Goldthorpe (1992) and Kerckhoff et al.17






Comparison (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1. Britain 1972 (P) 45.3 53.7 24.0 168.4***
vs. U.S. 1973 (Q) 56.7 48.3 20.8 420.4*** 7.9 7.5 7.2 2.4
2. Britain 1881 (P) 43.0 35.5 23.7 836.6***
vs. U.S. 1880 (Q) 45.4 48.5 11.9 287.2*** 14.4 108.9*** 5.9 11.2**
3. U.S. 1880 (P) 50.6 57.7 12.1 385.4***
vs. U.S. 1973 (Q) 56.7 43.7 20.8 420.4*** 10.7 46.7*** 2.4 3.2
4. U.S. 1900 (P) 54.0 54.1 14.6 545.4***
vs. U.S. 1973 (Q) 56.7 51.8 20.8 420.4*** 9.1 36.7*** 2.4 3.9
Notes: M is total mobility (percent off the main diagonal), MN is total mobility using the marginal
frequencies from the other table, G
2 is the likelihood ratio P
2 statistic with significance levels 
*** < 0.01 ** < 0.05 * < 0.10. Degrees of freedom: 9 for columns (4), (6), and (8); 5 for column (10).
Table 2. Summary Measures of Mobility in Britain and the U.S.
(1985) that, after accounting for differences in their occupational distributions, Britain and the U.S.
exhibited similar intergenerational occupational mobility in the third quarter of the twentieth
century.
Britain vs. the U.S. in the Nineteenth Century
How different were Britain and the U.S. in intergenerational occupational mobility a century
earlier? Table 3 presents the cross-classification of sons’ and father’s occupations using our new data
linking fathers in 1850 (U.S.) or 1851 (Britain) and sons in 1880 (U.S.) or 1881 (Britain). Summary
mobility measures again appear in Table 2. The simplest measure of mobility shows the U.S. with a
slight advantage (inheritance of the father’s occupation was 2.4 percentage points less likely in the18
Father's Occupation
White Skilled/
Son's Occupation       Collar Farmer          Semiskilled Unskilled      Row Sum
Britain (Table P):
  White Collar 124.0       31.0      223.0       46.0      424.0
                      (36.6)     (11.1)     (13.9)      (5.4)
  Farmer         10.0      114.0       38.0       20.0      182.0
                       (2.9)     (40.9)      (2.4)      (2.3)
  Skilled/Semiskilled 175.0       91.0     1119.0      391.0     1776.0
                      (51.6)     (32.6)     (69.6)     (45.6)
  Unskilled         30.0       43.0      227.0      400.0      700.0
                       (8.8)     (15.4)     (14.1)     (46.7)
  Column Sum 339.0      279.0     1607.0      857.0 3082.0
U.S. (Table Q):
  White Collar 55.0      177.0       82.0       30.0      344.0
                      (38.5)     (12.9)     (22.6)     (23.3)
  Farmer         44.0      850.0       92.0       35.0     1021.0
                       (30.8)     (62.0)     (25.3)     (27.1)
  Skilled/Semiskilled 33.0      214.0      166.0       40.0      453.0
                      (23.1)     (15.6)     (45.7)     (31.0)
  Unskilled         11.0      129.0       23.0       24.0      187.0
                       (7.7)      (9.4)      (6.3)     (18.6)
  Column Sum 143.0     1370.0      363.0      129.0 2005.0
Table 3. Intergenerational Occupational Mobility in Britain and the U.S., 1850-51 to 1880-81, Males
43-49 in Terminal Year. Frequencies (Column Percent).
U.S.), but substantial differences in occupational distributions obscure much larger differences. If
the U.S. had Britain’s occupational distribution, the U.S. advantage in total mobility would have been
5.5 percentage points; if Britain had the U.S. distribution, the U.S. advantage would have been 9.9
percentage points. Finally, if Britain and the U.S. had swapped occupational distributions and
retained their underlying association between fathers’ and sons’ occupations, the U.S. advantage
would have been 13 percentage points.
These simple comparisons suggest that more fundamental measures of association between
fathers’ and sons’ occupations would reveal a weaker association (and greater mobility) in the U.S.
The second set of summary mobility measures in Table 2 shows that this was indeed the case:19
though the association between fathers’ and sons’ occupations differed from independence in
Britain and the U.S., the magnitude of the association was twice as great in Britain as in the U.S. We
can safely reject the null hypothesis that the difference between them in their associations was
actually zero. The point estimate for d(P,Q) was 14.4, indicating a difference in mobility after
controlling for occupational distributions that was not only statistically significant but also large in a
substantive sense.
Table 4 disaggregates [d(P,Q)]
2 into its components, and calculates the contribution of each
of the [d i(P,Q)]
2 that account for three quarters of [d(P,Q)]
2 to the total. G
2 is also reported for each
contrast, as well as the underlying odds ratios from P and Q. For example, the first entry is the
relative advantage in entering farming rather than unskilled work from having a farmer father rather
than an unskilled father. In Britain, sons of farmers were 53 times more likely to enter farming rather
than unskilled work than were the sons of unskilled workers. In the U.S., the ratio was only 4.5 to
one, so the advantage of having a farm father rather than an unskilled father in making this move
(into farming rather than unskilled work) was more than 11 times greater in Britain than in the U.S.
This odds ratio contrast alone accounts for nearly 12 percent of the difference between the
association in P and the association in Q. Of the eleven odds ratios that account for 75 percent of
the difference in association between P and Q, six display a smaller disadvantage in the U.S. in
entering farming rather than another occupation for the sons of non-farmers, indicating that an
important source of greater intergenerational mobility in the U.S. than in Britain was an easier path20
Odds Odds Pct. of Cumulative
Contrast d(P,I) Ratio G
2 d(Q,I) Ratio G
2 d(P,Q) G
2 Total Percent
[(FF)/(FU)]/[(UF)/(UU)]  7.94  53.02  280.27***  3.02  4.52  25.30***  4.93  40.18***  11.6  11.6
[(FF)/(FU)]/[(SF)/(SU)]  5.52  15.84  149.36***  1.00  1.65  3.65* 4.53  45.68***  9.8  21.5
[(WW)/(WU)]/[(UW)/(UU)]  7.16  35.94  267.33***  2.77  4.00  11.21***  4.39  17.30***  9.3  30.7
[(WW)/(WF)]/[(FW)/(FF)]  7.64  45.60  161.69***  3.58  6.00  65.49***  4.06  24.32***  7.9  38.6
[(WF)/(WS)]/[(FF)/(FS)]  6.18  21.92  128.34***  2.18  2.98  18.80***  3.99  25.47***  7.7  46.3
[(FW)/(FU)]/[(UW)/(UU)]  3.67  6.27  39.42***  0.19  1.10  0.10  3.48  17.95***  5.8  52.1
[(FF)/(FS)]/[(UF)/(US)]  6.40  24.49  203.75***  3.03  4.54  37.08***  3.37  22.66***  5.5  57.6
[(FF)/(FS)]/[(SF)/(SS)]  7.22  36.89  337.03***  3.94  7.17  181.68***  3.28  40.55***  5.2  62.7
[(FW)/(FF)]/[(SW)/(SF)]  6.14  21.58  169.82***  2.91  4.28  67.65***  3.24  27.71***  5.0  67.8
[(WF)/(WU)]/[(FF)/(FU)]  4.15  7.95  30.41***  1.00  1.65  1.86  3.15  9.47***  4.8  72.5
[(WW)/(WF)]/[(UW)/(UF)]  3.37  5.39  16.97***  0.75  1.46  1.39  2.61  6.22** 3.3  75.8
Table  4. Components of d(P,I), d(Q,I), and d(P,Q) for Britain 1851-81 (P) vs. U.S. 1850-80 (Q). First element of each pair is father’s occupation, second
is son’s. W: White Collar, S: Skilled, F: Farmer, U: Unskilled.21
Father's Occupation
White Skilled/
Son's Occupation       Collar Farmer          Semiskilled Unskilled      Row Sum
U.S. 1880 (Table P):
  White Collar       115.0      233.0      115.0       39.0      502.0
                      (46.0)     (13.8)     (25.2)     (16.5)
  Farmer         43.0      949.0      103.0       60.0     1155.0
                       (17.2)     (56.2)     (22.5)     (25.3)
  Skilled/Semiskilled 59.0      286.0      173.0       75.0      593.0
                      (23.6)     (16.9)     (37.9)     (31.6)
  Unskilled        33.0      220.0       66.0       63.0      382.0
                       (13.2)     (13.0)     (14.4)     (26.6)
  Column Sum       250.0     1688.0      457.0      237.0 2632.0
Table 5. Intergenerational Occupational Mobility in the U.S., 1860-80, Males 33-39 in Terminal
Year. Frequencies (Column Percent).
to farm ownership from outside agriculture, regardless of the distribution of occupations for fathers
and sons. But the importance of farming by no means exhausts the sources of higher mobility in the
U.S. For example, in Britain, white collar sons had a 36 to one advantage in entering white collar
rather than unskilled jobs compared to the sons of unskilled workers; in the U.S., their advantage
was only 4 to one, less than an eighth of the advantage in making this transition conveyed in Britain
by having a white collar father.
Not only is overall mobility greater in the U.S., but upward mobility also exceeds that in
Britain. Without a comparable scheme of fully ranked occupational categories for both countries, a
complete analysis of upward and downward mobility is impossible. However, some conclusions
follow from innocuous assumptions. Assuming that unskilled occupations are less desirable than all
others, Table 3 indicates that in the U.S. 81.4 percent of all sons of unskilled laborers moved up into
other occupations, while only 53.3 percent of unskilled British sons experienced upward mobility; if
the British marginal distribution of occupations is imposed on the U.S. mobility table, the U.S.22
advantage is narrowed but not eliminated (upward mobility in the U.S. falls to 62.2 percent,
compared to 53.3 percent in Britain), while if the U.S. marginal distribution of occupations is
imposed on the British mobility table, the British disadvantage is narrowed slightly but remains large
(upward mobility in Britain rises to 58.7 percent, compared to 81.4 percent in the U.S.). Downward
mobility in the U.S. was lower than in Britain: 8.7 percent moved into unskilled labor in the U.S.
versus 13.5 percent in Britain, though this difference is reversed if either the British or U.S. marginal
distributions are used for both countries. The U.S. was not only a less static labor market than
Britain, but also a labor market with better prospects for upward movement even after accounting
for differences between its occupational structure and Britain’s. Observed downward mobility was
also less frequent in the U.S. than in Britain, but would have been slightly greater in the U.S. than in
Britain if the two countries had the same marginal distributions of occupation. 
Nineteenth Century vs. Twentieth Century Mobility in the U.S.
The difference in mobility between Britain and the U.S. in the nineteenth century was
substantial, both before and after taking account of differences in their distributions of occupations.
We have already seen that Britain and the U.S. were indistinguishable in terms of intergenerational
occupational mobility in the third quarter of the twentieth century, after taking account of their
occupational distributions. How was this convergence in underlying mobility achieved? Did U.S.
mobility fall or did British mobility rise to U.S. levels? We cannot directly assess the change over
time in British mobility in the absence of nineteenth century longitudinal data that span twenty years,
unless we were to include the Great Depression. For the U.S. however, we have samples that span
1860-80 and 1880-1900 that are identical in their construction to the 1850-80 sample we used in the
comparison to Britain 1851-81. Males age 33-39 at the end of the 1860-80 and 1880-1900 U.S.
samples can be compared to males age 33-39 in the 1973 cohort of the OCG. These samples then23
both span either exactly 20 years between fathers’ and sons occupations (1860 to 1880 and 1880 to
1900) or an average of 20 years between fathers’ and sons’ occupations (1949-55 to 1973). Table 5
presents the cross-classification of fathers’ and sons’ occupations for the 1860-80 data, which are
compared to the OCG data from the lower panel of Table 1. Summaries of the comparison between
them appear in the third set of contrasts in Table 2.
Total mobility shows a 6.1 percentage point advantage for the modern data, but when it is
calculated for both tables using common marginal frequencies, the nineteenth century table has
higher total mobility, by from one (using the 1860-80 frequencies) to 6.9 percentage points (using
the 1973 frequencies). If the marginal frequencies are swapped but the underlying associations are
left unchanged, the nineteenth century U.S. had a total mobility rate 1.3 times greater than that in the
1949-73 period. The more fundamental measure of mobility, d(P,Q), also shows greater mobility (i.e.
a weaker association between fathers’ and sons’ occupations) in the nineteenth century than in the
twentieth: we can safely reject the null hypothesis that the associations are equal (G
2=46.7 on 9
degrees of freedom, probability(H0: same association)< 0.0001), and the difference d(P,Q) is large in
magnitude. We cannot, however, reject the hypothesis that the associations are identical when the
diagonal elements in P and Q are excluded, suggesting that change in the likelihood of direct
inheritance of the father’s occupational status by the son was the greatest difference between these
eras, rather than more subtle change in the structure of association between one generation’s
occupation and that of the next.
Table 6 decomposes the elements of d(P,Q) into those that account for three quarters of the
difference between mobility in the nineteenth century and mobility in the twentieth. The single
greatest difference – making up nearly 15 percent of the difference between the association in the
nineteenth century and association in the twentieth – is in the upper left four cells of the24
contingency table. In the nineteenth century, getting a white collar rather than farm job was 11 times
more likely for the son of a white collar worker than for the son of a farmer; by the twentieth
century, the advantage of white collar sons had grown nearly eight-fold relative to farm sons in
getting white collar jobs rather than farm jobs. The second and third contrasts in Table 6 show
swings in the odds ratios of similar magnitude from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries (the
advantage of farm sons relative to skilled and semiskilled sons in getting (1) white collar rather than
farm jobs, and (2) farm jobs rather than unskilled jobs). Of the seven substantial differences between
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, three provide evidence of greater difficulty entering white
collar jobs (for the sons of farmers relative to sons of white collar workers, for the sons of skilled
workers relative to sons of farmers, and for sons of unskilled workers relative to sons of farmers).
The difference between nineteenth and twentieth century mobility persists into the last two
decades of the nineteenth century. If the 1880-1900 sample is used (P) and compared to the 1973
OCG cohort (Q), substantially more mobility is again observed in the historical data than in the
more recent past. Contrast 4 in Table 2 shows these results: total mobility was greater in the past if
the nineteenth century occupational distributions are used or if the occupational distributions are
swapped and each period retains its actual association between fathers’ and sons’ occupations. The
unadjusted total mobility and total mobility using the twentieth century frequencies, however, favor25
Odds Odds Pct. of Cumulative
Contrast d(P,I) Ratio G
2 d(Q,I) Ratio G
2 d(P,Q) G
2 Total Percent
[(WW)/(WF)]/[(FW)/(FF)] 4.78 10.89 176.51*** 8.86 84.02 159.17*** 4.09 16.29*** 14.7 14.7
[(FW)/(FF)]/[(SW)/(SF)] 3.03 4.55 95.11*** 6.97 32.62 131.80*** 3.94 27.39*** 13.7 28.3
[(FF)/(FU)]/[(SF)/(SU)] 2.03 2.76 31.77*** 5.88 18.91 72.34*** 3.85 21.52*** 13.0 41.4
[(WF)/(WU)]/[(FF)/(FU)] 2.39 3.31 22.33*** 5.87 18.80 40.93*** 3.47 8.93*** 10.6 52.0
[(FW)/(FF)]/[(UW)/(UF)] 1.95 2.65 18.42*** 5.26 13.89 53.91*** 3.32 12.80*** 9.7 61.6
[(FF)/(FS)]/[(SF)/(SS)] 3.44 5.57 154.21*** 6.52 26.01 115.85*** 3.08 16.58*** 8.4 70.0
[(WF)/(WS)]/[(FF)/(FS)] 3.03 4.55 51.26*** 5.95 19.60 55.06*** 2.92 7.15*** 7.5 77.5
Table  6. Components of d(P,I), d(Q,I), and d(P,Q) for U.S. 1860-80 (P) vs. U.S. 1973 (Q).19 The Superintendent of the Census reported in 1890 that “Up to and including 1880 the country
had a frontier of settlement, but at present the unsettled area has been so broken into by isolated bodies of
settlement that there can hardly be said to be a frontier line. In the discussion of its extent, its westward
movement, etc., it can not, therefore, any longer have a place in the census reports.” (U.S. Census Office,
1891).
20 Ferrie (forthcoming) includes comparisons between the nineteenth century data shown here and
twentieth century data from the NLS and NLSY79. In each case, the nineteenth century displays mobility that
is greater in magnitude than the twentieth century, differences that are in every case highly statistically
significant. By contrast, differences within the twentieth century are small in magnitude and seldom
statistically significant.
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the more recent data. But the underlying association measured by d(P,I), d(Q,I), and d(P,Q) was
substantially greater in the past than more recently. We can safely reject the hypothesis that the
association was identical (G
2=36.7 on 9 degrees of freedom, probability(H0: same association)<
0.0001). Even in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, mobility was greater than in the
1949-73 period, a difference that was both large in substance and statistically significant. High
mobility in the nineteenth century U.S. was thus not principally a consequence of the enormous
turnover in the U.S. labor force occasioned by the death of a substantial fraction of the working-age
male population in the Civil War, or of the presence of an expanding agricultural frontier – the
frontier was already “closed” by 1890, according to the U.S. Census Office.
19 It is also not the result
of some peculiarity of the OCG data used for the twentieth century, as similar results are obtained
when other modern surveys are employed.
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Economic Sources of Declining Relative Mobility in the U.S.
The U.S. was considerably more mobile than Britain in the nineteenth century and roughly
similar in mobility in the twentieth. At least some of this convergence occurred because of declining
mobility in the U.S. (as opposed to improved mobility in Britain). Unfortunately, the foregoing
analysis sheds little light on the sources of either the U.S. advantage in the nineteenth century or its
relative decline in mobility from the nineteenth century to the twentieth. Because the metric for the21 For example, the fourth contrast in Table 4 and the first in Table 6 – [(WW)/(WF)]/[(FW)/(FF)] –
is the ratio of the odds of white collar sons entering white collar jobs rather than farming to the odds of farm
sons entering white collar jobs rather than farming. It is greater in nineteenth century Britain and the
twentieth century U.S. than in the nineteenth century U.S. But is this because the nineteenth century U.S. has
(1) greater ease for farm sons in attaining white collar jobs in the nineteenth century U.S. (FW 8) , (2) a
weaker attachment to farming among farm sons (FF 9), (3) easier entry by white collar sons into farming (WF
8), or (4) a weaker attachment to white collar jobs among sons of white collar workers (WW 9)? Or does it
result from some combination of these? 
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distance in association used here focuses on odds ratios, it is not even possible to say for certain
whether the observed differences result from differences in the numerators, in the denominators, or
in both.
21 
Are the differences we have observed (between the mid-nineteenth century U.S. and either
mid-nineteenth century Britain or the mid-twentieth century U.S.) simply a reflection of differences
in the size of the farm sector, i.e. so many more farmers in the mid-nineteenth century U.S. and as a
result much movement out of farming and more “mobility?” The measure of mobility we have used
already adjusts for differences in the size of the occupation groups, however. If the mid-nineteenth
century U.S. farm sector is driving the results, it must be more than the difference in the sector’s
sheer size generating differences with Britain at the same time or the U.S. 100 years later. There
must be a selectivity effect as well.
Consider nineteenth century Britain versus the nineteenth century U.S.: Britain has already
seen almost all of its flight from agriculture by 1851, so the sons of farmer fathers are already
selected for remaining in farming (all the sons who were more loosely attached to the sector have
already left by 1851). At the same time, the sons of non-farm fathers are already selected for
remaining outside farming (all the sons eager to enter farming have already done so). In the U.S.,
this weeding out process has not taken place in the nineteenth century, so the U.S. has more
mobility both out of and into farming that gets added onto whatever the underlying amount of22 Of course, for the story to work for the nineteenth century versus twentieth century U.S. case,
there must be no increase in the selectivity of movement out of or into farming even as late as 1900 when
farmers as a fraction of the labor force had fallen to 20% from 45% in 1850.
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Figure 1.
mobility would be otherwise.
22 At least some of the high mobility in the nineteenth century U.S. may
then result from it being at an earlier stage of development than nineteenth century Britain or the
twentieth century U.S., so its farm sector
was relatively larger and selective exit from
farming and entry into farming were less
apparent than in Britain at the same time
or in the U.S. a century later. As late as
1850, 45 percent of U.S. workers were still
in farming, compared to 4 percent in
Britain in 1880 and 7 percent in the U.S. in
1950.
To get at the amount of mobility
after taking out the effect of selective mobility out of or into farming, we re-ran the analyses after
removing the cell Farm [father]-Farm [son] and the cells White Collar-Farm,
Skilled/Semiskilled-Farm, and Unskilled-Farm. This is preferable to leaving out the farm sector
altogether, as it still allows us to include the mobility of sons of farmers conditional on their
departure from farming. The results are
P=Britain 1851-81, Q=U.S. 1850-80
d(P,I)=15.43 (prob < 0.0001)
d(Q,I)= 9.17 (prob < 0.0001)
d(P,Q)=10.03 (prob < 0.0001)23 For example, the third contrast in Table 4 does not involve farmers. The fifth contrast in Table 4
(which is also the seventh in Table 6) – [(WF)/(WS)]/[(FF)/(FS)] – can be higher in nineteenth century
Britain and the twentieth century U.S. than in the nineteenth century U.S. because of selectivity only if exit
from farming by farm sons exceeded entry by white collar sons into farming by a greater margin in the
nineteenth century U.S. than in either nineteenth century Britain or the twentieth century U.S. If this was not
the case, differential entry into skilled and semi-skilled jobs by white collar and farm sons must also account
for some of the greater size of this contrast for the nineteenth century U.S. To see this, re-write the contrast
as [(WF)/(FF)]/[(WS)/(FS)].
24 Though these implications relate to earnings mobility, it is straightforward to map them into
occupational mobility. If there are two possible jobs and investment (by parents or the state) both raises (1)
the odds that sons of job 1 fathers will get job 1 rather than job 2 and (2) the odds that sons of job 2 fathers
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Even if we ignore the Farm-Farm immobility difference and ignore differences in entry into
farming, then, the differences in mobility still go in the same direction (the nineteenth century U.S. is
markedly more mobile than nineteenth century Britain). For the U.S. over time, the same is true as
well, though the remaining magnitudes are smaller:
P=U.S. 1860-80, Q=U.S. 1953-73
d(P,I)=8.32 (prob < 0.0001)
d(Q,I)=8.48 (prob < 0.0001)
d(P,Q)=3.48 (prob < 0.05).
Simple differences in the selectivity of exit from or entry into farming, in any case, cannot
explain the majority of the contrasts in Tables 4 and 6.
23 Other features of the nineteenth century
U.S. economy may help explain its uniquely high rates of mobility. A useful starting point for
analyzing the economic causes of differences in mobility across times or places is the formulation of
Becker and Tomes (1986) who model intergenerational mobility as an outcome generated by the
endowments transmitted directly from parents to children, and by investments made by parents
faced with several investment opportunities and possibly constrained by the operation of capital
markets from making the efficient level of investment in their children. 
As Grawe and Mulligan (2002) demonstrate, this simple model provides some testable
implications regarding spatial or temporal differences in earnings mobility.
24 Ignoring capitalwill get job 1 rather than job 2, but (2) rises by more than (1), the odds ratio will fall, indicating greater
mobility. The only additional assumption necessary for the implications discussed by Grawe and Mulligan
(2002) to apply to occupational mobility as well is that all workers qualified for job 1 can obtain job 1.
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constraints (generated by the inability of parents to borrow against the future labor earnings of
children), intergenerational earnings mobility will be higher when the ease with which ability is
transferred to children is reduced. Han and Mulligan (2001, p. 225) show that earnings mobility is
also greater when ability displays less variance. Finally, if parents are constrained in the credit
market, they will invest less in their children, whose earnings will more closely reflect ability,
reducing mobility. Where credit markets function well, or where wealth is greater so fewer parents
find the capital constraint binding, mobility will be greater than where credit markets do not
function well, or where most parents find themselves constrained by low wealth. 
We have no direct evidence on how easily abilities were transmitted from parents to children
in the nineteenth century in Britain and the U.S. or in the twentieth century U.S. But we can suppose
that the greater heterogeneity in the origins of the U.S. population compared to the British
population in the nineteenth century corresponded to greater variance in abilities in the U.S., a force
working to undermine the U.S. advantage in occupational mobility relative to Britain at this time.
Though we cannot test directly for the role of credit market constraints in generating the advantage
enjoyed by the U.S. relative to Britain in the nineteenth century and the decline in relative mobility
by the twentieth century, it is possible to see how important such impediments to investment may
have been in generating the level of mobility seen within the nineteenth century U.S. 
The 1860-80 sample provides information from the 1860 population census on the total
wealth owned by the household (the sum of real estate and personal estate). This makes is possible
to assess the role of credit constraints by examining whether mobility differs systematically by
household wealth, an indicator of the probability that a household is credit constrained. Following31
Mazumder (2001), the 1860-80 sample was divided in half: high total wealth families (wealth $
median wealth=$1,400) and low total wealth families (wealth < median). Intergenerational
occupational mobility matrices were then constructed (P=high wealth, Q=low wealth), and the
underlying association between fathers’ and sons’ occupations was calculated along with the
difference in association between P and Q. For both types of households, mobility was different
from that expected under independence though slightly greater in high wealth households
(d(P,I)=12.65, d(Q,I)=13.25, while the G
2 statistics for both are significant at 0.01. Of greater
interest is the difference in association between P and Q: d(P,Q)=6.14 (G
2=21.2, prob=0.01),
confirming that mobility in the 1860s and 1870s was in fact greater among high wealth households
than among low wealth households.
Grawe and Mulligan (2002, p. 51) suggest that “one way to investigate [the role of credit
market imperfections] is through analysis of cross-country evidence on whether countries with
greater public provision of human capital experience greater intergenerational mobility.” The U.S.
provided considerably more public education than Britain in the middle of the nineteenth century:
the primary school enrollment rate was one and a half times greater in the U.S. than in Britain.
(Easterlin, 1981, p. 7). The U.S. educational system in the second half of the nineteenth century,
though less extensive at the secondary and post-secondary levels than European systems was
considerably more egalitarian (Goldin, 1999, p. 2). To the extent that intergenerational mobility is
greater where fewer parents are constrained, superior mobility in the U.S. may well have been a
consequence of its educational system, which provided a public alternative to a private education
that was outside the reach of many families.
The importance of free, public education provides a less satisfactory explanation for the
trend in mobility over time within the U.S., though: while enrollment rates, graduation rates, and25 Becker and Tomes (1986, p. S31) suggest with some justification that capital constraints construed
more generally fell from the nineteenth century to the twentieth in the U.S. But this, too, runs counter to the
trend of decreasing mobility from the nineteenth century to the twentieth. The model’s prediction that larger
family size will be associated with lower investment per child and lower mobility (if fertility is exogenous) is
another force working against the finding of relatively greater mobility in the nineteenth century U.S. than in
the twentieth: the total fertility rate in the U.S. fell from 5.42 in 1850 to 2.98 in 1950.
26 The unusually high rates of residential mobility in the nineteenth century U.S. were remarked upon
by de Tocqueville (1835) who observed that in the U.S., “millions of men are marching at once toward the
same horizon; their language, their religion, their manners differ; their object is the same. Fortune has been
promised to them somewhere in the west, and to the west they go to find it.” These patterns were observed
by him as well in places only recently settled: “I have spoken of the emigration from the older states but how
shall I describe that which takes place from the more recent ones? Fifty years have scarcely elapsed since
Ohio was founded; the greater part of its inhabitants were not born within its confines; its capital has been
built only thirty years, and its territory is still covered by an immense extent of uncultivated fields; yet already
the population of Ohio is proceeding westward, and most of the settlers who descend to the fertile prairies of
Illinois are citizens of Ohio. These men left their first country to improve their condition; they quit their
second to ameliorate it still more; fortune awaits them everywhere, but not happiness.”
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spending have increased dramatically since the nineteenth century (Goldin, 1999, pp. 52-68),
intergenerational occupational mobility has nonetheless fallen. Though the educational requirements
to advance in occupational status (or to avoid a decline in occupational status) may have risen more
rapidly than the aggregate statistics on the provision of education, there is no evidence with which to
confront this conjecture.
25
A potentially more promising avenue for explaining both the U.S. advantage in mobility
compared to Britain within the nineteenth century and the decline in relative U.S. mobility since the
nineteenth century is to consider characteristics of the U.S. economy that correspond to both of
these contrasts. The most obvious candidate is residential mobility.
26 Both Schultz (1961) and Becker
(1964) suggested viewing migration as an investment. In the Becker and Tomes (1986) framework,
changes in location undertaken by the family can produce occupational mobility just as investment
by the family in the child’s human capital. After childhood, the individual himself may undertake
such investment to compensate for under-investment by a credit-constrained family or to take27 British counties were roughly the same size on average as U.S. counties.
33
advantage of investment opportunities that were unavailable to the family because they did not yet
exist or were overlooked by them.
In the British 1851-81 sample, 27 percent of sons crossed a county boundary over these
three decades, while in the U.S. 1850-80 sample, 62 percent did so.
27 In fact, in the U.S., men
changed states over thirty years as often as men in Britain changed counties. Though we lack
comparable data on mobility over a span of thirty years for the twentieth century U.S., the National
Longitudinal Survey (NLS) cohorts of Older Men and Young Men provide a comparison over ten
years, the shortest span we can observe in the nineteenth century linked files. Between 1870 and
1880, 55 percent of young (20-29 years) white, native-born males changed county and 30 percent
changed state; between 1971 and 1981, only 42 percent of otherwise identical males changed county,
while only 22 percent changed state. Among older men (45-59 years) the declines in both inter-
county mobility (from 35 percent 1870-80 to 16 percent 1966-76) and inter-state mobility (from 22
percent 1870-80 to 8 percent 1966-76) were even more dramatic.
Though mid-nineteenth century Britain was a considerably more compact economy with an
extensive transportation network, residential mobility was greater in the mid-nineteenth century U.S.
Though the U.S. experienced substantial improvements in transportation and flows of information
from the third quarter of the nineteenth century to the third quarter of the twentieth, residential
mobility rates actually fell. This suggests that the return to mobility in the 1850-80 period must have
been substantial – greater than in late nineteenth century Britain and greater than in the modern U.S.
It would be a mistake to attribute this high return directly to the presence of an open frontier in the
nineteenth century U.S., however, for two reasons: (1)  both residential and occupational mobility34
remained high through 1910, fully two decades after the closing of the frontier; and (2)  the frontier
was never the destination for more than a small fraction of U.S. internal migrants after 1850. 
Residential mobility may nonetheless have provided an alternative to direct investment in
human capital. Kim (1998) has shown that regional specialization in the U.S. increased through
1880, fell slightly through 1910, and then fell dramatically throughout the rest of the twentieth
century. This raises the possibility that throughout the second half of the nineteenth century,
differences in the  economic activities undertaken in different places left open another route to
advancement: migration to places that were growing more rapidly than others. Some of these places
of unusual opportunity were cities that sprang up initially to provide services demanded as the
frontier expanded. For example, Chicago’s population grew ten-fold in just the twenty years after
1850, then nearly tripled over the next two decades, providing a site of substantial opportunity.
(Galenson, 1991) Though U.S. labor markets were well-integrated at the regional level by the middle
of the nineteenth century, at least within the North (Margo, 2000; Rosenbloom, 1996), differences
across smaller units of geography may have continued to present opportunities for “locational
arbitrage” that provided a route to occupational change through the start of the twentieth century.
Conclusion
Though the U.S. exhibited no more intergenerational occupational mobility in the late
twentieth century than similarly developed countries, a widely-shared belief that the U.S. is a place of
unusually easy mobility has consistently guided public policy and shaped debate regarding the
appropriate functions of the government in promoting social welfare from the 1930s to the present.
Using new longitudinal data for the nineteenth century, we have identified an era when the U.S.
mobility experience was indeed exceptional: even after controlling for differences in their
occupational structures, the U.S. had substantially more occupational mobility across generations35
than either Britain in the three decades after 1850 or the modern U.S. Though it remains to be seen
exactly why nineteenth century U.S. mobility exceeded that in both nineteenth century Britain and
the twentieth century U.S., and when the transition to a lower mobility regime in the U.S. took place,
high U.S. intergenerational occupational mobility corresponded to high rates of residential mobility.
A fall in U.S. residential mobility after 1910 as economic activity across locations became more
homogenous may have reduced the ability of families and individuals to “invest through migration”
and foster occupational mobility across generations. 28  The 1851 data for Britain are from a 2% Public Use Sample available as Study No. 1316 from the
U.K. Data Archive at the University of Essex (http://www.dataarchive.ac.uk). It is a stratified two percent
systematic cluster sample from the enumerators’ books. For a full description see Anderson (1987). The
complete 1881 census for Britain was obtained as Study No. 3643 from the U.K. Data Archive. The 1880
U.S. file was obtained from the North American Population Project (http://www.nappdata.org) and the 1850
U.S. 1% Public Use Sample was obtained from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series available from the
Minnesota Population Center (http://www.ipums.org).
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Appendix
The population censuses of Britain and the U.S. are generally regarded to be the best sources
of individual-level, nationally representative data from the nineteenth century for those countries.
However, the cross-sectional censuses do not provide the continuity over time needed to study
issues of mobility at the level of the individual. Two new sources have made it possible to create the
necessary continuity from the British and U.S. historical census records. The Genealogical Society of
Utah in conjunction with the Federation of Family History Societies has computerized the
individual-level records from the enumerators’ books of the 1881 Census of the Population of
England, Wales, and Scotland and from the 1880 U.S. Federal Population Census. These data make
it possible to search for specific individuals in the 1881 British or 1880 U.S. census. To construct the
data for this study, we searched for individuals from two other censuses: the 1851 British and the
1850 U.S. census.
For Britain, we attempted to match all the English and Welsh born males age 25 and below
from the computerized two percent sample of the 1851 census compiled principally by Anderson,
Collins, and Stott. For the U.S. we attempted to match white males age 25 and below from the 1850
Federal Census one percent public use sample.
28  We employed a common matching technique for
the British and U.S. data. Both countries’ censuses provide information that either remains
consistent between enumerations (name and birthplace) or changes predictably (age) that can be
used to identify a given individual in more than one census. The British census has more specific29 The smaller margin of age reporting error for the U.S. matching process is in response to the less
specific birthplace information. For a discussion of age enumeration in the Victorian census, see Higgs (1986).
30 The same procedure created the 1860-80, 1880-1900, and 1870-80 linked U.S. samples.
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information than the U.S. census on each individual’s birthplace (parish in Britain, state in the U.S.).
In the 1880 U.S. census, respondents were asked to give the place of birth of their parents as well
(state for those whose parents were born in the U.S. and country for those whose parents were born
abroad). This question was missing entirely from the nineteenth century British census.
For Britain, in order to be considered a true match for an individual from 1851, an individual
from 1881 had to have either the same name or a close phonetic variation thereof (for example,
Aitken and Aitkin were considered to be equivalent), a year of birth different by no more than five
years, and the same county and parish of birth. For the U.S., the individual must provide the same
state of birth for himself (and his parents if they were present in 1850) in 1850 and 1880, and the
year of birth could differ by no more than three years. The variation in birth year was allowed in
order to account for age misreporting, a fairly common phenomenon in nineteenth century societies
which lacked the systematic record keeping and where individuals often had only an approximate
idea of their age.
29 None of the matching information could be missing from an individual’s record.
Also, only unique matches were considered: if an individual from the 1850/51 sample had more
than one match in the 1880/81 census, then that individual was dropped.
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Applying this matching process to 69,785 English and Welsh males age 25 and under from
the 1851 two percent sample yielded 14,191 men observed in Britain both in 1851 and 1881,  a
success rate of 20%. From a pool of 43,438 U.S. white  males age 25 and under in 1850, 9,497 were
found in the 1880 U.S. census, a 22 percent success rate. For each country, the data come from two
nationally representative sources, so as long as the matching process does not skew the sample, the31 Each linked individual thus enters the regression twice: once in the linked sample and once in the
public use sample. This is done to facilitate comparison with the regressions in Columns (2) and (4) of each
table in which weights are imposed to make the linked individuals nationally-representative (rather than
merely indistinguishable from the unlinked). For the British, 8,655 individuals in the public use sample for
1851 were missing one or more of the characteristics used in the probit analysis and were dropped from the
regressions in Columns (1) and (2) of Table A-2. For the comparisons with 1880 and 1881, 25 percent
random samples of the complete files for those years were used rather than the complete files.
32 The large coefficients on the migration history variables in Column (3) of Table A-2 result from
the inability to identify the year of arrival in the U.S. for immigrants present in the U.S. in 1880 (the excluded
category in the regression).
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set of matched individuals should also be representative of the two national populations that
survived 1850-80 and 1851-81. In order to assess the representativeness of the linked samples, we
compared their characteristics to those in the public use samples for the initial year (1850 or 1851)
and terminal year (1880 or 1881). Tables A-1 and A-2 present marginal effects from probit
regressions in which the dependent variable is 1 for observations from the linked sample and 0 for
observations from the public use sample.
31
In general, the matched samples represent the overall population quite well. Though several
of characteristics exert a statistically significant influence on the probability of linkage, compared to
the predicted probability the magnitude is small in each case.
32 In order to reduce the impact of
these already small differences between the linked samples and the general population, we
constructed weights to produce linked samples that would duplicate the marginal frequencies of the
characteristics in the general population. (Deming and Stephan, 1940) Two sets of weights were
generated, one for the initial year and one for the terminal year. In Columns (2) and (4) of Tables A-
1 and A-2, the weights are imposed on the linked individuals, leaving them statistically
indistinguishable from the general population. Though we have used the unweighted data
throughout this paper, the results are insensitive to the imposition of these weights.39
1850, No Weights 1850, Weights 1880, No Weights  1880, Weights
Variable  MP/MX MP/MX  (MP/MX)x100  (MP/MX)x100
Age 15-25 in 1850  0.0017  0.0013  0.0314  0.0000
(0.41)  (0.31)  (14.38)***  (0.01)
Residence:
  Midwest  -0.0478  -0.0008  -0.0216  0.0001
(11.26)***  (0.19)  (8.40)***  (0.02)
  South
a  -0.0519  -0.0011  -0.0235  0.0002
(12.13)***  (0.25)  (9.17)***  (0.04)
  West  -0.0398  0.0003
(7.83)***  (0.02)
Population > 2,500  -0.0013  -0.0028
(0.25)  (0.52)
Migration History:
  Interstate Mover  -0.0124  -0.0001  0.3214  -0.0001
(1.34)  (0.01)  (43.35)***  (0.02)
  Birthstate=Residence  0.0090  0.0001  0.3123  -0.0002
(1.10)  (0.01)  (50.16)***  (0.03)
Family Size  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0004  -0.0004
(0.44)  (0.35)  (1.22)  (0.50)
Occupation
b:
  Farmer  0.0138  -0.0015  0.0126  -0.0003
(2.07)**  (0.22)  (4.16)***  (0.04)
  Skilled  0.0003  -0.0011  -0.0014  -0.0001
(0.05)  (0.14)  (0.38)  (0.01)
  Semi-Skilled  0.0086  -0.0008  -0.0012  -0.0000
(0.93)  (0.08)  (0.28)  (0.00)
  Laborer  0.0128  -0.0019  -0.0102  0.0001
(1.52)  (0.22)  (2.85)***  (0.01)
 Other  -0.0106  -0.0011  -0.0059  -0.0001
(0.88)  (0.09)  (0.98)  (0.01)
Household Real Estate:
  0 < Real Estate < $1,500  0.0104  0.0024
(2.37)**  (0.54)
  Real Estate $$1,500  0.0255  -0.0025
(5.62)***  (0.56)
Father Literate  -0.0067  -0.0058
(1.09)  (0.93)
Attended School  0.0065  0.0006
(1.82)*  (0.17)
Household Head  -0.0014  0.0024
(0.35)  (0.26)
Married  0.0094  -0.0022
(2.65)***  (0.25)
Observations  52,935  52,935  1,766,147  1,766,147
Pseudo-R
2  0.0071  0.0001  0.0356  0.0000
Predicted Probability  0.1794  0.1794  0.0014  0.0014
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. * significant at * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Omitted categories: “Age 0-14 in
1850,” “Northeast,”, “Population # 2,500”, “Foreign-Born,” “White Collar,” “Household Real Estate=0,” “Father
Illiterate,” “Not Attending School,” “Non-Head,” and “Unmarried.” 1880 uses a 25% sample of the unlinked.
a Includes “West” in 1850. 
b Father’s occupation in 1850, Son’s occupation in 1880.
Table A-1. Probit Marginal Effects on Linkage (1=linked sample, 0=Public Use Sample), U.S.40
1851, No Weights 1851, Weights 1881, No Weights  1881, Weights
Variable  MP/MX MP/MX  MP/MX  MP/MX
Age 15-25 in 1851 0.0069 0.0015 -0.0015 0.0000
(1.48) (0.30) (21.32)*** (0.44)
Residence:
  London 0.0335 0.0067 0.0011 -0.0002
(4.46)*** (0.87) (6.41)*** (1.12)
  Midlands-East 0.0354 0.0078 0.0012 -0.0002
(4.97)*** (1.06) (7.21)*** (0.94)
  North 0.0405 0.0091 0.0004 -0.0002
(5.66)*** (1.23) (2.85)*** (1.15)
  South 0.0305 0.0056 0.0022 -0.0002
(4.17)*** (0.75) (11.58)*** (0.90)
Migration History:
  Birth County=Residence 0.0698 0.0014 0.0007 0.0000
(13.64)*** (0.22) (9.66)*** (0.52)
Occupation
a:
  Farmer 0.0148 0.0030 0.0014 0.0000
(3.90)*** (0.78) (8.65)*** (0.01)
  Craftsman 0.0332 0.0065 0.0005 -0.0001
(5.52)*** (1.09) (6.00)*** (1.03)
  Laborer 0.0131 0.0023 0.0000 -0.0001
(3.69)*** (0.62) (0.44) (0.81)
Attended School 0.0167 0.0026
(4.81)*** (0.73)






Observations 75,321 75,321 934,852 934,852
Pseudo-R
2 0.0043 0.0001 0.0065 0.0000
Predicted Probability 0.1830 0.1886 0.0038 0.0041
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Omitted categories: “Age 0-14 in
1851,” “Wales,” “Other.” 1881 uses a 25% sample of the unlinked. 
a Father’s occupation in 1851, Son’s occupation in
1881.
Table A-2. Probit Marginal Effects on Linkage (1=linked sample, 0=Public Use Sample), Britain.
A final concern is whether the linkage process has resulted in too many “false positives”
(individuals who are not in fact the same person in both the initial and terminal years). For the
comparison between the U.S. and Britain in the nineteenth century, this is a difficulty if the sample
for one country has more false positives than the sample for the other. For example, more false
positives in the U.S. than in Britain will generate more “noise” in comparing the occupations of41
fathers and sons, and lead to a spurious finding of greater occupational mobility in the U.S. than in
Britain. For the comparison over time within the U.S., it is also a problem, because the data for the
twentieth century were constructed in a way that prevented such incorrect matches (the respondent
in the OCG was asked himself to state the occupation of his father when the respondent was 16
years of age). Greater “noise” in the nineteenth century U.S. data would also produce a spurious
finding of greater mobility in the nineteenth century U.S. than in the twentieth.
The comparison between mobility in Britain 1851-81 and in the U.S. 1850-80 was performed
again, but this time with the samples restricted to those whose surnames matched exactly and whose
age was off by no more than one year. The results were quite similar to those shown in the second
panel of Table 2:
P=Britain 1851-81, Q=U.S. 1850-80
d(P,I)=24.50 (prob < 0.0001)
d(Q,I)= 14.22 (prob < 0.0001)
d(P,Q)=15.22 (prob < 0.0001)
Though mobility in the U.S. with the more restricted sample is slightly farther from what we would
observe if the occupations of fathers and sons were independent, the difference between mobility in
the U.S. and in Britain is actually slightly greater. When the 1880-1900 U.S. sample is restricted to
those whose surname matched exactly and whose age was off by no more than a year, the nineteenth
century U.S. remained substantially more mobile than the twentieth century though the magnitude
of the difference is reduced. We again can reject the null hypothesis that the association between the
occupations of fathers and sons was identical in these two eras:
P=U.S. 1880-1900, Q=U.S. 1953-73
d(P,I)=15.90 (prob < 0.0001)
d(Q,I)=20.76 (prob < 0.0001)
d(P,Q)=6.94 (prob < 0.005).42
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